الرئيسية هندسة هندسة الإنتاج والتصميم الميكانيكى

Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers

اسم المؤلف

Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers

التاريخ

تاريخ النشر5 أبريل 2024

التصنيف

فيهندسة الإنتاج والتصميم الميكانيكى

المشاهدات

661

التقييم

(لا توجد تقييمات)

التحميل

Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers
Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
New York, NY
vii
CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . xv
LIST OF FIGURES .xvii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .xxi
GLOSSARY . xxv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxxiii
PREFACE xxxv

Introduction 1
1.1 Purpose of this Handbook 1
1.2 Target Audience .1
1.3 Process Safety – What Is It? 1
1.4 Organization of the Book .3
1.5 References 4
Process Safety Basics .5
2.1 Risk Based Process Safety .5
Pillar: Commit to Process Safety . 12
2.2 Process Safety Culture . 12
2.3 Compliance with Standards . 15
2.4 Process Safety Competency . 17
2.5 Workforce Involvement . 18
2.6 Stakeholder Outreach . 19
Pillar: Understand Hazards and Risks 20
2.7 Process Knowledge Management 20
2.8 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis 22
Pillar: Manage Risk . 25
2.9 Operating Procedures . 25
2.10 Safe Work Practices . 26
2.11 Asset Integrity and Reliability . 28 viii INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
2.12 Contractor Management . 30
2.13 Training And Performance Assurance . 32
2.14 Management of Change . 33
2.15 Operational Readiness . 35
2.16 Conduct of Operations . 37
2.17 Emergency Management . 38
Pillar: Learn from Experience 42
2.18 Incident Investigation 42
2.19 Measurement and Metrics 45
2.20 Auditing . 46
2.21 Management Review and Continuous Improvement . 48
2.22 Summary 49
2.23 References 50
The Need for Process Safety 53
3.1 Process Safety Culture: BP Refinery Explosion, Texas City, 2005 . 58
3.1.1 Summary . 58
3.1.2 Detailed Description . 58
3.1.3 Causes . 59
3.1.4 Key Lessons 61
3.1.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 63
3.2 Asset Integrity and Reliability: ARCO Channelview, Texas Explosion, 1990
. 64
3.2.1 Summary . 64
3.2.2 Detailed Description . 64
3.2.3 Causes . 65
3.2.4 Key Lessons 65
3.2.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 65
3.3 Process Safety Culture: NASA Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster, 2003 . 66
3.3.1 Summary . 66
3.3.2 Detailed Description . 66CONTENTS ix
3.3.3 Causes . 68
3.3.4 Key Lessons 69
3.3.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 70
3.4 Process Knowledge Management: Concept Sciences Explosion, Hanover
Township PA, 1999 . 70
3.4.1 Summary . 70
3.4.2 Detailed Description . 70
3.4.3 Cause . 72
3.4.4 Key Lessons 73
3.4.5 References and links to Investigation Reports 73
3.5 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Esso Longford Gas Plant
Explosion, 1998 . 73
3.5.1 Summary . 73
3.5.2 Detailed Description . 74
3.5.3 Cause . 76
3.5.4 Key Lessons 76
3.5.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 77
3.6 Operating Procedures: Port Neal, IA, Ammonium Nitrate Explosion, 199477
3.6.1 Summary . 77
3.6.2 Detailed Description . 77
3.6.3 Causes . 79
3.6.4 Key Lessons 80
3.6.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 80
3.7 Safe Work Practices: Piper Alpha, North Sea, UK, 1988 80
3.7.1 Summary . 80
3.7.2 Detailed Description . 81
3.7.3 Causes . 83
3.7.4 Key Lessons 84
3.7.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 85x INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
3.8 Contractor Management: Partridge Raleigh Oilfield Explosion, Raleigh, MS,
2006 . 85
3.8.1 Summary . 85
3.8.2 Detailed Description . 85
3.8.3 Cause . 86
3.8.4 Key Lessons 86
3.8.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 88
3.9 Asset Integrity and Reliability: Explosion at Texaco Oil Refinery, Milford
Haven, UK, 1994 . 88
3.9.1 Summary . 88
3.9.2 Detailed Description . 88
3.9.3 Causes . 89
3.9.4 Key Lessons 90
3.9.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 91
3.10 Conduct of Operations: Formosa Plastics VCM Explosion, Illiopolis, IL,
2004 . 91
3.10.1 Summary . 91
3.10.2 Detailed Description . 91
3.10.3 Causes . 94
3.10.4 Key Lessons 94
3.10.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 95
3.11 Management of Change: Flixborough Explosion, UK, 1974 . 95
3.11.1 Summary . 95
3.11.2 Detailed Description . 95
3.11.3 Cause . 98
3.11.4 Key Lessons 98
3.11.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 99
3.12 Emergency Management: Sandoz Warehouse Fire, Switzerland, 1986 . 99
3.12.1 Summary . 99
3.12.2 Key Lessons 101CONTENTS xi
3.12.3 References and links to investigation reports 102
3.13 Conduct of Operations: Exxon Valdez, Alaska, 1989 . 102
3.13.1 Summary . 102
3.13.2 Detailed Description . 102
3.13.3 Causes . 105
3.13.4 Key Lessons 105
3.13.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 106
3.14 Compliance with Standards: Mexico City, PEMEX LPG Terminal, 1984
. 106
3.14.1 Summary . 106
3.14.2 Detailed Description . 106
3.14.3 Causes . 109
3.14.4 Key Lessons 109
3.14.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 109
3.15 Process Safety Culture: Methyl Isocyanate Release, Bhopal, India, 1984
. 110
3.15.1 Summary . 110
3.15.2 Detailed Description . 110
3.15.3 Key Lessons 111
3.15.4 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 112
3.16 Failure to Learn, BP Macondo Well Blowout, Gulf of Mexico, 2010 . 113
3.16.1 Summary . 113
3.16.2 Detailed Description . 113
3.16.3 Key Lessons 118
3.16.4 References and Links to Investigation Reports . 119
3.17 Summary 119
3.18 References 120
Process Safety for Engineering Disciplines 121
4.1 Introduction 121
4.2 Process Knowledge Management 121xii INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
4.3 Compliance with Standards . 124
4.4 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, Management Of Change . 126
Management of Organizational Change 127
4.5 Asset Integrity and Reliability . 128
4.6 Safe Work Practices . 129
4.7 Incident Investigation 130
4.8 Resources for Further Learning . 130
4.8 Summary 132
4.9 References 132
Process Safety in Design 133
5.1 Process Safety Design Strategies . 133
5.2 General Unit Operations and Their Failure Modes 134
5.2.1 Pumps, Compressors, Fans . 134
5.2.2 Heat Exchange Equipment 141
5.2.3 Mass Transfer; Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption . 146
5.2.4 Mechanical Separation / Solid-Fluid Separation . 152
5.2.5 Reactors and Reactive Hazards . 158
5.2.6 Fired Equipment . 163
5.2.7 Storage 167
5.3 Petroleum Processing . 179
5.3.1 General Process Safety Hazards in a Refinery 180
5.3.2 Crude Handling and Separation 182
5.3.3 Light Hydrocarbon Handling and Separation . 183
5.3.4 Hydrotreating 184
5.3.5 Catalytic Cracking 185
5.3.6 Reforming . 187
5.3.7 Alkylation . 188
5.3.8 Coking . 190
5.4 Transient Operating States . 192
5.4.1 Overview . 192CONTENTS xiii
5.4.2 Example Process Safety Incidents 192
5.4.3 Design Considerations 194
5.5 References 194
Course Material . 199
6.1 Introduction 199
6.2 Inherently Safer Design . 199
6.3 Process Safety Management and Conservation of Life . 199
6.4 Process Safety Overview and Safety in the Chemical Process Industries 200
6.5 Process Hazards . 201
6.5.1 Chemical Reactivity Hazards 201
6.5.2 Fires and Explosions . 202
6.5.3 Other Hazards . 203
6.6 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis 203
6.7 Emergency Relief Systems 205
6.8 Case Histories 206
6.8.1 Runaway Reactions . 206
6.8.2 Other Case Histories . 207
6.9 Other Modules . 209
6.10 Summary 209
6.11 References 209
Process Safety in the Workplace 211
7.1 What to Expect . 211
7.1.1 Formal Training 211
7.1.2 Interface with Operators, Craftsmen . 214
7.2 New Skills 215
7.2.1 Non-Technical 215
7.2.2 Technical . 216
7.3 Safety Culture 217
7.4 Conduct of Operations . 218
7.4.1 Operational Discipline 218xiv INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
7.4.2 Engineering Discipline 230
7.4.3 Management Discipline 232
7.4.4 Other Conduct of Operations Topics for the New Engineer . 237
7.5 Summary 238
7.6 References 238
APPENDIX A – EXAMPLE RAGAGEP LIST 241
APPENDIX B – LIST OF CSB VIDEOS . 245
APPENDIX C – REACTIVE CHEMICALS CHECKLIST 249
C.1 Chemical Reaction Hazard Identification . 249
C.2 Reaction Process Design Considerations 252
C.3 Resources and Publications . 254
APPENDIX D – LIST OF SACHE COURSES . 257
APPENDIX E – Reactivity Hazard Evaluation Tools 259
E.1 Screening Table and Flowchart . 259
E.2 Reference . 262
INDEX 263xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1. Comparison of RBPS elements to OSHA PSM elements . 10
Table 2.2. Examples and sources of process safety related standards, codes,
regulations, and laws. 16
Table 2.3 Hazard evaluation synonyms . 23
Table 2.4 Typical HAZOP review table format . 24
Table 2.5. Activities typically included in the scope of the safe work element . 28
Table 3.1 Selected incidents and Process Safety Management systems. . 54
Table 4.1. Process safety activities for new engineers 122
Table 4.2. Incidents with organizational change involvement . 128
Table 5.1 Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design considerations for
fluid transfer equipment . 140
Table 5.2 Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design considerations for
heat exchange equipment . 147
Table 5.2 Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design considerations for
heat exchange equipment, continued. 148
Table 5.3 Common failure modes, causes, consequences, design considerations for
reactors . 164
Table 7.1 Example simplified process safety training class matrix. 212
Table A-1. RAGAGEP List for XYZ Chemicals . 241
Table B.1 List of CSB Videos . 245
Table D.1 List of SACHE Courses 257
Table E.1 Example Form to Document Screening of Chemical Reactivity Hazards
. 259xvii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Picture of a nitroglycerine reactor in the 19th century. .7
“Alfred Nobel in Scotland”. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Web. 15 Sep
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/dolan/ .7
Figure 2.2. Continuous nitroglycerine reactor, courtesy Biazzi SA
(www.Biazzi.com) .7
Figure 2.3. Illustration of risk. . 11
Figure 2.4. Challenger Disaster, courtesy NASA. . 12
Figure 2.5. Building damage and charge tank crater, Hydroxylamine explosion,
courtesy CSB. 20
Figure 2.6. Collapsed tank at Motiva refinery, courtesy CSB. 27
Figure 2.7. Rupture in 52-inch component of line, courtesy CSB . 29
Figure 2.8. Aerial view of the burning Monsanto plant after the 1947 Texas City
Disaster, (http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth11883) University of
North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, crediting Moore Memorial
Public Library, Texas City, Texas. 39
Figure 2.9. CCPS and API Process Safety Metric Pyramid (Ref. 2.46). . 44
Figure 2.10. Photograph of failed end of heat exchanger, (Ref. 2.33) . 47
. 57
Figure 3.1. Swiss Cheese model of incidents, Ref. 3.1 57
Figure 3.2. Process flow diagram of the Raffinate Column and blowdown drum,
source (CCPS, 2008). 59
Figure 3.3. Texas City Isom Unit aftermath, courtesy CSB. . 60
Figure 3.4. Portable buildings destroyed where contractors were located, courtesy
CSB 60
Figure 3.5. Process flow diagram of wastewater tank. 64
Figure 3.6. Columbia breaking up, courtesy NASA. . 67
Figure 3.7. A shower of foam debris after the impact on Columbia s left wing. The
event was not observed in real time, courtesy NASA 67
Figure 3.8. Damage to Concept Sciences Hanover Facility, courtesy Tom Volk,
The Morning Call. . 71
Figure 3.9. Simplified process flow diagram of the CSI HA vacuum distillation
process, courtesy CSB. 72
Figure 3.10. Simplified schematic of absorber, (CCPS, 2008) 74
Figure 3.11. Simplified schematic of the gas plant (CCPS, 2008) . 75
Figure 3.12 Neutralizer and rundown tank, source, (EPA, 1996) 78
Figure 3.13. AN plant area after explosion, source, (EPA 1996). . 79xviii INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
Figure 3.14. Piper Alpha platform, source (CCPS, 2008). 81
Figure 3.15. Schematic of Piper Alpha platform, source (CCPS, 2008) 82
Figure 3.16. Tanks involved in the Partridge Raleigh oilfield explosion, source
(CSB, 2006) . 86
Figure 3.17. Tank 3 lid, source (CSB, 2007) . 87
Figure 3.18. Ref. ( CCPS, 2008) Picture courtesy of Western Mail and Echo Ltd.89
Figure 3.19. The 30 inch flare line elbow that failed and released 20 tons of vapor,
source (HSE, 1994) 90
Figure 3.20. Smoke plumes from Formosa plant, source (CSB 2007). . 92
Figure 3.21. Reactor building elevation view, source (CSB 2007) . 92
Figure 3.22. Cutaway of the reactor building, source (CSB 2007) 93
Figure 3.23. Schematic of Flixborough piping replacement, source Report of the
Court of Inquiry. 96
Figure 3.24. The collapsed 20 inch pipe. . 97
Figure 3.25. Damage to Flixborough plant 98
Figure 3.26. Damage to Flixborough control room. 98
Figure 3.27. Sandoz Warehouse firefighting efforts, source (CCPS, 2008) 100
Figure 3.28. Impact of Sandoz Warehouse firewater runoff, (CCPS, 2008). 101
Figure 3.29. Exxon Valdez tanker leaking oil, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Trustee Council 103
Figure 3.30. Oiled loon onshore, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee
Council . 103
Figure 3.31. Aerial of a maxi-barge with water tanks and spill works hosing a
beach, Prince William Sound, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council.
. 104
Figure 3.32. Cleanup workers spray oiled rocks with high pressure hoses, courtesy
of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. 104
Figure 3.33 Layout of PEMEX LPG Terminal, source, CCPS, 2008) . 107
Figure 3.34. PEMEX LPG Terminal prior to explosion source, CCPS, 2008. 108
Figure 3.35. PEMEX LPG Terminal after the explosion source, CCPS, 2008 108
Figure 3.36. Schematic of emergency relief effluent treatment system that included
a scrubber and flare tower in series, source AIChE . 111
Figure 3.37. Photograph taken shortly after the incident. A pipe rack is shown on
the left and the partially buried storage tanks (three total) for MIC are located in
the center of the photo right, (source Willey 2006). 112
Figure 3.38. Fire on Deepwater Horizon, source (CSB, 2010) 114
Figure 3.39. Location of Mud-Gas separator, source (TO, 2011) 115
Figure 3.40. Gas release points, source (TO, 2011) . 116
Figure 3.41. Macondo Well blowout preventer, source (CSB 2010) . 117
Figure 5.1. Damage from fire caused by mechanical seal failure. . 135LIST OF FIGURES xix
Figure 5.2. Pump explosion from running isolated 136
Figure 5.3. Schematic of centrifugal pump, Ref. 5.6. 137
Figure 5.4. Single and Double Mechanical Seals, Ref. 5.7 137
Figure 5.5. Two-screw type PD Pump, courtesy Colfax Fluid Handling. . 139
Figure 5.6. Rotary Gear PD pump, source http://www.tpub.com/gunners/99.htm.
. 139
Figure 5.7. Example application data sheet, courtesy of OEC Fluid Handling 142
Figure 5.8. Ruptured pipe from reaction with heat transfer fluid. . 143
Figure 5.9. Shell and tube heat exchanger, Ref. 5.9 . 144
Figure 5.10. Cutaway drawing of a Plate-and-Frame Heat Exchanger, Ref. 5.10145
Figure 5.10. Schematic of air cooled heat exchanger, Ref. 5.11 145
Figure 5.12. Double tube sheet, courtesy www.wermac.org . 146
Figure 5.13. A. Example distillation column schematic Ref. 5.11, and B. typical
industrial distillation column, ©Sulzer Chemtech Ltd . 148
Figure 5.14. Schematic of carbon bed adsorber system, Ref. 5.16. . 150
Figure 5.15. Damage to dust collector bags, Ref. 5.25 154
Figure 5.16. Tube sheet of dust collector, Ref. 5.25 155
Figure 5.17. A horizontal peeler centrifuge with a Clean-In-Place system and a
discharge chute, (Ref. 5.26) . 156
Figure 5.18. Cross sectional view of a continuous pusher centrifuge (Ref 5.26).
. 156
Figure 5.19. Schematic of baghouse, courtesy Donaldson-Torit. 157
Figure 5.20. Dust collector explosion venting, courtesy Fike 157
Figure 5.21. Seveso Reactor, adapted from SACHE presentation by Ron Willey.
. 159
Figure 5.22. T2 Laboratories site before and after the explosion, Ref. 5.28 160
Figure 5.23. T2 Laboratories blast, Ref. 5.28. . 161
Figure 5.24. Portion of 3 inch thick reactor, Ref. 5.28. . 161
Figure 5.25. Damaged heater, Example 1 165
Figure 5.26. Heater and adjacent column at NOVA Bayport plant, Example 2. . 165
Figure 5.27. Buncefield before the explosion and fires, Ref. 5.32 . 169
Figure 5.28. Buncefield after the explosion and fires, Ref 5.32. . 169
Figure 5.29. Molasses tank failure; before and after 170
Figure 5.30. 1) Pipe connections in panel 2) Chemfos 700 and Liq. Add lines . 170
Figure 5.31. Cloud of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide 171
Figure 5.32. Tank collapsed by vacuum. . 172
Figure 5.33. Schematic diagram of UST leak detection methods, courtesy EPA,
Ref. 5.36. . 172
Figure 5.34. Mounded underground tank, courtesy BNH Gas Tanks 173xx INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
Figure 5.35. Schematics of external (a) and internal floating (b) roof tanks,
courtesy of petroplaza.com 174
Figure 5.36 Pressurized gas storage tank . 176
Figure 5.37. Refinery flow diagram, Ref. 43 . 180
Figure 5.39. Atmospheric separation process flow diagram, courtesy OSHA . 182
Figure 5.40. Hydrotreater process flow diagram, Ref. 5.43 . 184
Figure 5.41. Fluid Catalytic Cracking (FCC) process flow diagram, Ref. 41 186
Figure 5.42. CCR Naphtha Reformer process flow diagram, Ref. 43. 187
Figure 5.46. HF Alkylation process flow diagram. Ref. 5.46 189
Figure 5.44. Process flow diagram for a delayed coker unit, Ref. 5.43. 190
Figure 5.45. Polymer catch tank, Ref. 5.50 193
Figure 7.1. Car Seal on a valve handle. Seal can be broken in an emergency if
necessary to change the position of a valve, courtesy 228xxi
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACC American Chemistry Council
AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers
API American Petroleum Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
BMS Burner Management System
CEI Chemical Exposure Index (Dow Chemical)
CFR Code of Federal Registry
CMA Chemical Manufacturers Association
CSB US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CCR Continuous Catalyst Regeneration
COO Conduct of Operations
CPI Chemical Process Industries
DCU Delayed Coker Unit
DDT Deflagration to Detonation Transition
DIERS Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems
ERS Emergency Relief System
EPA US Environmental Protection Agency
FCCU Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit
F&EI Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical)
FMEA Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Studyxxii INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
HTHA High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
HSE Health & Safety Executive (UK)
I&E Instrument and Electrical
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
ISD Inherently Safer Design
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISOM Isomerization Unit
ITPM Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance
LFL Lower Flammable Limit
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
LOTO Lock Out Tag Out
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
MCC Motor Control Center
MIE Minimum Ignition Energy
MOC Management of Change
MOOC Management of Organizational Change
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDT Non Destructive Testing
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
OCM Organizational Change Management
OIMS Operational Integrity Management System (ExxonMobil)
OSHA US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
PLC Programmable Logic ControllerACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS xxiii
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PRD Pressure Relief Device
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
PSB Process Safety Beacon
PSE Process Safety Event
PSI Process Safety Information
PSI Process Safety Incident
PSM Process Safety Management
PSO Process Safety Officer
PSSR Pre-Startup Safety Review
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis
RBPS Risk Based Process Safety
RAGAGEP Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice
RMP Risk Management Plan
SACHE Safety and Chemical Engineering Education
SCAI Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks
SHE Safety, Health and Environmental (sometimes written as EHS or
HSE)
SHIB Safety Hazard Information Bulletin
SIS Safety Instrumented Systems
SME Subject Matter Expert
TQ Threshold Quantity
UFL Upper Flammable Limit
UK United Kingdom
US United States
UST Underground Storage Tankxxv
GLOSSARY
Asset integrity A PSM program element involving work activities that
help ensure that equipment is properly designed, installed
in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for
purpose over its life cycle. Also called asset integrity and
reliability.
Atmospheric
Storage Tank
A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure
between ambient pressure and 0.5 psig (3.45kPa gage).
Boiling-LiquidExpanding-Vapor
Explosion
(BLEVE)
A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid
contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly
depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition
from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release.
A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied
by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire
impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a
common cause. However, it is not necessary for the
liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.
Checklist Analysis A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more preprepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt
team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are
adequate.
Chemical Process
Industry
The phrase is used loosely to include facilities which
manufacture, handle and use chemicals.
Combustible Dust Any finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or
smaller in diameter (material passing through a U.S. No.
40 standard sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard
when dispersed and ignited in air or other gaseous
oxidizer.
Conduct of
Operations (COO)
The embodiment of an organization’s values and
principles in management systems that are developed,
implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational
tasks in a manner consistent with the organization’s risk
tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed
deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in
performance.
Explosion A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity
or blast wave.xxvi INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis
A hazard identification technique in which all known
failure modes of components or features of a system are
considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.
Flammable
Liquids
Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below 100 F
(37.8 C), as determined by the test procedures described
in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40
psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100 F (37.8 C), as determined
by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor
Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA
liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points
below 73 F (22.8 C) and boiling points below 100 F
(37.8 C). Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that
have flash points below 73 F (22.8 C) and boiling points
at or above 100 F (37.8 C). Class IC liquids shall
include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73
F (22.8 C), but below 100 F (37.8 C). (NFPA 30).
Hazard Analysis The identification of undesired events that lead to the
materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the
mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur
and usually the estimation of the consequences.
Hazard and
Operability Study
(HAZOP)
A systematic qualitative technique to identify process
hazards and potential operating problems using a series of
guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is
used to question every part of a process to discover what
deviations from the intention of the design can occur and
what their causes and consequences may be. This is done
systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a
systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and
continuous plants, which can be applied to new or
existing processes to identify hazards
Hazard
Identification
The inventorying of material, system, process and plant
characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences
through the occurrence of an incident.
Hazard
Identification and
Risk Analysis
(HIRA)
A collective term that encompasses all activities involved
in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities,
throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to
employees, the public, or the environment are
consistently controlled within the organization’s risk
tolerance.
Hot Work Any operation that uses flames or can produce sparks (e.g.,
welding).GLOSSARY xxvii
Incident An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more
undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage
to the environment, or asset/business losses. Such events
include fires, explosions, releases of toxic or otherwise
harmful substances, and so forth.
Incident
Investigation
A systematic approach for determining the causes of an
incident and developing recommendations that address the
causes to help prevent or mitigate future incidents. See also
Root cause analysis and Apparent cause analysis.
Interlock A protective response which is initiated by an out-of-limit
process condition. Instrument which will not allow one part
of a process to function unless another part is functioning.
A device such as a switch that prevents a piece of
equipment from operating when a hazard exists. To join
two parts together in such a way that they remain rigidly
attached to each other solely by physical interference. A
device to prove the physical state of a required condition
and to furnish that proof to the primary safety control
circuit.
Layer of
Protection
Analysis (LOPA)
An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (causeconsequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the
initiating event frequency, independent protection layer
failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to
compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for
determining where additional risk reduction or more
detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified
elsewhere, typically using a scenario-based hazard
evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.
Lockout/Tagout A safe work practice in which energy sources are positively
blocked away from a segment of a process with a locking
mechanism and visibly tagged as such to help ensure worker
safety during maintenance and some operations tasks.
Management of
Change (MOC)
A system to identify, review and approve all modifications
to equipment, procedures, raw materials and processing
conditions, other than “replacement in kind,” prior to
implementation.
Management
System
A formally established set of activities designed to produce
specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable
basis.
Mechanical
Integrity
A management system focused on ensuring that equipment
is designed, installed, and maintained to perform the desired
function.xxviii INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
Near-Miss An unplanned sequence of events that could have caused
harm or loss if conditions were different or were allowed to
progress, but actually did not.
Operating
Procedures
Written, step-by-step instructions and information necessary
to operate equipment, compiled in one document including
operating instructions, process descriptions, operating
limits, chemical hazards, and safety equipment
requirements.
Operational
Discipline (OD)
The performance of all tasks correctly every time; Good OD
results in performing the task the right way every time.
Individuals demonstrate their commitment to process safety
through OD. OD refers to the day-to-day activities carried
out by all personnel. OD is the execution of the COO
system by individuals within the organization.
Operational
Readiness
A PSM program element associated with efforts to ensure
that a process is ready for start-up/restart. This element
applies to a variety of restart situations, ranging from restart
after a brief maintenance outage to restart of a process that
has been mothballed for several years.
Organizational
Change
Any change in position or responsibility within an
organization or any change to an organizational policy or
procedure that affects process safety.
Organizational
Change
Management
(OCM)
A method of examining proposed changes in the structure or
organization of a company (or unit thereof) to determine
whether they may pose a threat to employee or contractor
health and safety, the environment, or the surrounding
populace.
OSHA Process
Safety
Management
(OSHA PSM)
A U.S. regulatory standard that requires use of a 14-element
management system to help prevent or mitigate the effects
of catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from
processes covered by the regulations 49 CFR 1910.119.
Pressure Relief
Valve (PRV)
A pressure relief device which is designed to reclose and
prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions
have been restored.
Pressure Safety
Valve (PSV)
See Pressure Relief ValveGLOSSARY xxix
Pre-Startup
Safety Review
(PSSR)
A systematic and thorough check of a process prior to the
introduction of a highly hazardous chemical to a process.
The PSSR must confirm the following: Construction and
equipment are in accordance with design specifications;
Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures
are in place and are adequate; A process hazard analysis has
been performed for new facilities and recommendations and
have been resolved or implemented before startup, and
modified facilities meet the management of change
requirements; and training of each employee involved in
operating a process has been completed.
Preventive
Maintenance
Maintenance that seeks to reduce the frequency and severity
of unplanned shutdowns by establishing a fixed schedule of
routine inspection and repairs.
Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA)
A commonly used term in the nuclear industry to describe
the quantitative evaluation of risk using probability theory.
Process Hazard
Analysis (PHA)
An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards
associated with processes and operations to enable their
control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative
techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards.
Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are
developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to
help prioritize risk reduction.
Process
Knowledge
Management
A Process Safety Management (PSM) program element that
includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and
provide information to other PSM program elements.
Process safety knowledge primarily consists of written
documents such as hazard information, process technology
information, and equipment-specific information. Process
safety knowledge is the product of this PSM element.
Process Safety
Culture
The common set of values, behaviors, and norms at all
levels in a facility or in the wider organization that affect
process safety.
Process Safety
Incident/Event
An event that is potentially catastrophic, i.e., an event
involving the release/loss of containment of hazardous
materials that can result in large-scale health and
environmental consequences.
Process Safety
Information (PSI)
Physical, chemical, and toxicological information related to
the chemicals, process, and equipment. It is used to
document the configuration of a process, its characteristics,
its limitations, and as data for process hazard analyses.xxx INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SAFETY FOR UNDERGRADUATES
Process Safety
Management
(PSM)
A management system that is focused on prevention of,
preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, and restoration
from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a
process associated with a facility.
Process Safety
Management
Systems
Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices
designed to ensure that barriers to episodic incidents are in
place, in use, and effective.
Reactive Chemical A substance that can pose a chemical reactivity hazard by
readily oxidizing in air without an ignition source
(spontaneously combustible or peroxide forming), initiating
or promoting combustion in other materials (oxidizer),
reacting with water, or self-reacting (polymerizing,
decomposing or rearranging). Initiation of the reaction can
be spontaneous, by energy input such as thermal or
mechanical energy, or by catalytic action increasing the
reaction rate.
Recognized and
Generally
Accepted Good
Engineering
Practice
(RAGAGEP)
A term originally used by OSHA, stems from the selection
and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and
maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and
maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring
safety and preventing process safety incidents.
It involves the application of engineering, operating or
maintenance activities derived from engineering knowledge
and industry experience based upon the evaluation and
analyses of appropriate internal and external standards,
applicable codes, technical reports, guidance, or
recommended practices or documents of a similar nature.
RAGAGEP can be derived from singular or multiple
sources and will vary based upon individual facility
processes, materials, service, and other engineering
considerations.
Responsible
Care©
An initiative implemented by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA) in 1988 to assist in leading chemical
processing industry companies in ethical ways that
increasingly benefit society, the economy and the
environment while adhering to ten key principles.
Risk Management
Program (RMP)
Rule
EPA’s accidental release prevention Rule, which requires
covered facilities to prepare, submit, and implement a risk
management plan.GLOSSARY xxxi
Risk-Based
Process Safety
(RBPS)
The Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) PSM
system approach that uses risk-based strategies and
implementation tactics that are commensurate with the riskbased need for process safety activities, availability of
resources, and existing process safety culture to design,
correct, and improve process safety management activities.
Safety
Instrumented
System (SIS)
The instrumentation, controls, and interlocks provided for
safe operation of the process.
Vapor Cloud
Explosion (VCE)
The explosion resulting from the ignition of a cloud of
flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds
accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce
significant overpressure.